By: ACG James Sunday (Rtd), FCAI, MNIIA
The most recent ambush attack on military forces along the Damboa–Biu axis of Borno State by ISWAP has left many security experts in a dilemma over who currently has the upper hand and what goes wrong whenever troops come under assault by these elements.
As devastating as the news is, we must come to terms with an important lesson in conflict reporting: the issue of wrong timing in broadcasting unverified information, and the need to avoid sensational reportage of attacks on federal troops. Such reports often serve as clues or intelligence for the fighters and have negative effects, including exposing or selling out the troops’ next line of action, especially when they are under fierce attack and attempting to re-mobilise, advance, or retreat.
The enemies of the state never share their operational information while under attack. They only release details after a successful encounter, or as propaganda, or to create a pathway for possible escape from the killing zone. Why then are conventional and social media reporters always in a rush to be the first to “break the news,” even when the subject is as sensitive as an ongoing attack on troops? This premature disclosure of unverified information often comes at the detriment of the soldiers on the ground.
For the purpose of this article, I call on all social media users to be more sensitive and apply restraint when reporting armed conflicts that are ongoing or fierce, to avoid persistent pitfalls and reduce the risk of exposing federal troops.
Many times, this rush to broadcast news leads to greater collateral damage, increases casualties, and gives the elements an opportunity to regroup because leaked information reveals the position of federal troops. Today and always, we must continue to celebrate our gallant troops by boosting their morale and encouraging them, not by revealing premature information about their movements, locations, or sketchy and unverified incidents. The elements work on every piece of information available to reorganise and prepare for reprisal or fresh attacks.
We rarely receive information about the activities of the elements as much as we reveal that of the federal troops. This is avoidable and is a disservice to the gallant forces who put their lives on the line for all of us. We must protect them by refraining from issuing unverified, time-sensitive statements ahead of official sources. Any pre-emptive or unverified information represents a setback for the troops. The only way forward is to apply restraint and avoid becoming enemies to ourselves by giving the elements a field day to exploit advanced knowledge, which leads to the killing and maiming of operatives in the theatre of war.
Our hearts go out to the troops and the Armed Forces of Nigeria at this trying moment. We must not forget that these elements are always out to test the pedigree, grip, and command of newly appointed Service Chiefs. This has always been their mechanism of distraction and a means of assessing capability and readiness.
There is a need to change the pattern of approach and to shield field commanders from being easily exposed in first-line encounters. Layers of insulation, embedding, and protection must be hardened so that they cannot be easily penetrated or overrun during ambushes. Equipment deployed must be more sophisticated, and logistics must be fortified to protect commanders until reinforcement arrives. We cannot continue losing our best officers to these fighters.
The Armed Forces must look inward to reduce casualty levels by increasing layers of protection, both in the air and on the ground, and deploying reinforced troops who are not easily penetrable. New patterns of operation must be introduced, as conventional methods are increasingly vulnerable to ambush-style attacks. A shift toward stronger air-to-ground operations, with more strategic air support, will make the ground forces more impenetrable and better positioned to devastate and decimate the terrorist fighters.
Having toured the two major theatres of war. Borno and Yobe, during my service years, I can fairly suggest that warfare strategy must evolve in response to the peculiar nature of the conflict on the ground.